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THE LAW OF THE IMAGE AND THE IMAGE OF THE LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
 In this article I present an argument about the rule of law—one which I think 
has not been adequately articulated previously. To develop this argument I want to 
draw on two distinct perspectives. The first is historical. In order to try to understand 
the ways in which ideas about the rule of law operate, I return to a powerful, yet 
perhaps unfamiliar, statement of rule of law values from colonial Van Diemen’s Land 
(now called Tasmania and part of the Commonwealth of Australia) in the first part 
of the nineteenth century. I contrast this statement with a notorious abandonment of 
those values at the same time and in the same place: the genocide of its indigenous 
inhabitants. The historical comparison will help us see just how it is that governments 
then and now seem able to hold simultaneously in their heads two contradictory 
realities—the rule of law on the one hand and the treatment of indigenous people on 
the other—without, apparently, exploding at the irony of it.1
 The second perspective, related to the first, is methodological: in trying to 
comprehend what it means to talk about the rule of law in relation to colonized 
peoples, this essay focuses not on essays in political theory or pieces of legislation, but 
on two art works. One of the earliest and most celebrated articulations of the “rule of 
law” in all of Britain’s imperial history is to be found in a series of illustrations that 
spoke directly to the colonial government’s relationships with Aboriginal people. 
These images afford a remarkably complex, revealing, and relevant representation of 
the rule of law. But they should not be understood as merely illustrative of the law, if 
such a distinction can be maintained. Art and law are here entwined and inseparable. 
 That one of the most significant statements of the rule of law in Australian 
colonial history was produced for Aboriginal people and in the form of a picture tells 
us something. In the first place, the rule of law is not merely a legal or technical 
term. It is a social fact. To understand it properly, our sources must extend beyond 
the pages of textbooks and law reviews (present company excepted) into the social 
world—its representations and deployment in art, literature, children’s books, movies, 
and newspapers. Secondly, the genre of a work of art brings distinct and important 
dimensions to our legal analysis. On the one hand, images offer an accessibility and 
an immediacy that should not be underestimated. By and large, one has to take my 
word for the purport of the articles and written sources I am going to discuss. But 
the images that form the basis of this article are available to any reader who can draw 
(so to speak) their own conclusions. The reciprocity between writer and reader that 
this establishes contributes significantly to the richness and power of the interpretative 
1. In Desmond Manderson, Not Yet: Aboriginal People and the Deferral of the Rule of Law, 29/30 Arena j. 
219 (2008), I develop an extended application of these ideas to contemporary indigenous policy in 
Australia, making the argument that radical changes to government policy and legislation in 2007 
entrenched radical and unexamined departures from rule of law principles in line with the historical 
argument I develop here. See generally Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act 2007 (NT) 
(Austl.); Social Security and Other Legislation Amendment (Welfare Payment Reform) Act 2007 (NT) 
(Austl.); Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and Other Legislation Amendment (Northern 
Territory National Emergency Response and Other Measures) Act 2007 (NT) (Austl.).
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conversation.2 On the other hand, images have an essential role to play as we learn 
more about how communities understand law and justice. Images have a density to 
them, a complexity in their depiction of the relationship of ideas and forces. Their 
non-linearity makes them a particularly appropriate means of communicating 
paradoxical, ambiguous, or double-edged ideas. Writing, particularly academic or 
legal writing, privileges and perhaps even demands the communication of a single 
well-organized logic.3 Art is more multiple than that.4 The image’s honesty—its 
capacity to say to us more even than it intended to say—to reveal assumptions, 
tensions, and paradox, is part of what makes it such a genuinely revelatory and 
gravely underutilized legal resource.
II. AN AUSTRALIAN MYTH
 The “rule of law” is a phrase that encompasses a body of principles which 
endeavour to prevent, through law, the arbitrary or tyrannical exercise of state power 
and to enhance society’s faith in government. One thinks immediately of Aristotle: 
“[A] government of laws and not of men.”5 But in attempting to put some flesh on 
this idea, to work out what kind of lawmaking is impermissible in a government 
committed to legality, there is an enormous diversity of opinion. This is not the place 
to spend too much time on a question that I have explored at greater length 
elsewhere.6 Suffice it to say that scholars are divided between those who adhere to a 
more or less formal conception of the rule of law and those for whom it must include 
protections of substantive equality of treatment too.7 But theoretical debates will take 
you only so far. If we want to better understand what it means to talk about the rule 
of law, we need to be more specific about culture and context. And it is often in a 
legal system’s treatment of minority or underprivileged groups that the rule of law is 
challenged and developed.
 With that in mind, I turn to the specific context of British colonial history and 
to one of the earliest and most remarkable articulations of the rule of law in Australia. 
This articulation is not in words, but in images. What is often called Governor 
Davey’s Proclamation to the Aborigines 1816 (fig. 1) is an iconic document in Australian 
2. See M.M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays (Michael Holquist ed. & trans., Carly 
Emerson trans., 1981).
3. See Ivan Illich & Barry Sanders, ABC: The Alphabetization of the Popular Mind (1st 
Vintage Books ed., Vintage Books 1989) (1988); Jack Goody, The Logic of Writing and the 
Organization of Society (1986).
4. See Law and the Image (Costas Douzinas & Lynda Nead eds., 1999).
5. Iain Stewart, Men of Class: Aristotle, Montesquieu and Dicey on ‘Separation of Powers’ and ‘The Rule of 
Law,’ 4 Macquarie L.J. 187, 194 (2004).
6. See Desmond Manderson, Kangaroo Courts and the Rule of Law: The Legacy of Modernism 
(2012).
7. Brian Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory 3 (2004).
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history.8 A full fifty years before A.V. Dicey,9 it represents an idea of the rule of law 
occasioned by the clash between colonial and indigenous peoples. Confronted by the 
clash of two radically different cultures and mutually incomprehensible languages, 
the Proclamation does so without using words—a picture that is also a law.10
 First circulated in Van Diemen’s Land in the early part of the nineteenth century, 
the Proclamation was largely forgotten until it turned up during renovations of Old 
Government House in Hobart. It formed part of the Tasmanian display at the 
Melbourne Intercolonial and the Paris Universal Exhibitions in the 1860s,11 a proud 
statement of the benevolent virtues of the imperial civilizing process.12 Yet for all its 
fame, few have bothered to really analyze the picture. Descriptions of the Proclamation 
mostly cast it as an explanation of martial law or as a warning to the Aborigines of 
the consequences “of continuing in their present murderous and predatory habits.”13 
Lyndall Ryan’s pioneering The Aboriginal Tasmanians erroneously interprets it as 
endorsing the separate and harmonious living of two cultures,14 whereas it clearly 
represents the coming together and indeed conformity of those cultures under British 
rule. The Proclamation is a myth—an object so familiar that it has ceased to be seen.
 Images are treacherous; labels more so. As it happens, Governor Davey’s Proclamation 
to the Aborigines 1816 had nothing to do with Governor Davey. It does not date from 
1816. And it is not really a proclamation. It was commissioned by Lieutenant-
Governor Sir George Arthur; in 1830, around one hundred copies were published by 
the government printer in Hobart, placed on wooden boards, and disseminated.15 
The misattribution dates from its re-discovery in the 1860s and might be explained 
in two ways. First, by setting the date back almost a generation, the notion that the 
British colony was founded on the principle of the rule of law is thereby promoted. 
Law always needs some mythic retrospectivity to shore up its legitimacy—a penal 
colony established by dispossession and maintained by violence over whites and 
blacks alike, especially.16 The violence and chaos that mark the birth of any new legal 
order thus become cloaked in a myth that emphasizes instead its inevitability, its 
order, and its naturalness. By the 1860s, it surely served the interests of Tasmania’s 
8. Governor Davey’s Proclamation to the Aborigines (c. 1828–1830). Oil on huron pine board, 36 
x 22.8cm, State Library of Tasmania. Kind permission to reproduce acknowledged.
9. A.V. Dicey, Lectures Introductory to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (2d ed. 
1886).
10. The words at the top and bottom of Figure 1 were added later; probably at the time of the republication 
of the document for the Melbourne Intercolonial Exhibition, 1866.
11. The Dictionary of Australian Artists 274 (Joan Kerr ed., 1992).
12. Penelope Edmonds, Imperial Objects, Truths and Fictions: Reading Nineteenth-Century Australian Colonial 
Objects as Historical Sources, in Rethinking Colonial Histories: New and Alternative 
Approaches 73, 83 (Penelope Edmonds & Samuel Furphy eds., 2006).
13. The Dictionary of Australian Artists, supra note 11, at 273.
14. Lyndall Ryan, The Aboriginal Tasmanians 97 (Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd. 2d ed. 1996) (1981).
15. See The Dictionary of Australian Artists, supra note 11, at 272–74.
16. See generally Jacques Derrida, Declarations of Independence, 7 New Pol. Sci. 7 (1986). 
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free settlers to inject the rule of law into their narrative of legitimate settlement, as 
early as possible.
 Secondly, Thomas Davey cuts a more attractive figure as author of the 
Proclamation than Sir George Arthur. As governor, Davey had protested in 1814 his 
“utter indignation and abhorrence” about the kidnapping of Aboriginal children.17 
But Governor Arthur was an altogether more paradoxical figure, a man who 
oscillated wildly between expressions of concern for the Aborigines and military 
campaigns against them; between inciting white settlers to kill Tasmania’s first 
inhabitants and expressing outrage when they did. He was a man who combined 
eruptions of extreme action with outbursts of remorseful reflection.18 Above all, as 
the man behind the notorious Black Line, the dragnet which attempted to corral like 
cattle the Aboriginal population of the whole island, Arthur symbolizes a way of 
thinking about the original Tasmanians that “would be laughable were it not so 
criminally tragic.”19 Such a background surely taints and complicates the promise of 
the rule of law.
 The cartoon was suggested and apparently drawn by Arthur’s Surveyor-General 
George Frankland, and he in turn was inspired by Aboriginal bark paintings. In 
1829, Frankland wrote to Arthur,
I have lately had an opportunity of ascertaining that the Aboriginal natives of 
van Diemen’s Land are in the habit of representing events by drawings on the 
bark of trees . . . . In the absence of all successful communication with these 
unfortunate people, with whose language we are totally unacquainted, it has 
occurred to me that it might be possible through the medium of this newly 
discovered facility, to impart to them to a certain extent, the real wishes of 
the government towards them, and I have accordingly sketched a series of 
groups of figures, in which I have endeavoured to represent in a manner as 
simple and as well adapted to their supposed ideas as possible, the actual state 
of things . . . .20
 The four panels of the pictogram (Frames A–D) trace a development, but not an 
historical one. Instead, the pictures might be said to trace a movement from 
philosophy to politics to law. Frame A describes abstract equality: men and children 
are presented as the same regardless of colour, and the image of a white woman 
nursing a black baby parallels that of a black woman nursing a white one. The image 
is not a statement of what the rule of law requires, nor a statement of what the rule of 
law will achieve, but instead it is a declaration of underlying principles. Two related 
features of what we might call this “state of nature,” whose idealism and peacefulness 
clearly owe more to Rousseau than to Hobbes, stand out.21 The first is its 
17. Henry Reynolds, Fate of a Free People 90 (1995).
18. Id.
19. Lloyd Robson, History of Tasmania 225 (1983).
20. The Dictionary of Australian Artists, supra note 11, at 273.
21. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (Edwin Curley ed., 1994); Rousseau, The Discourses and Other 
Early Political Writings (Victor Gourevitch ed., 6th prtg. 2003). 
159
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 57 | 2012/13
individualism: humans are presented here not as belonging to societies or cultures. 
The equality that matters is individual and pre-social, not collective and cultural. 
Secondly, this individualism does not lead to a world in which everybody is different 
from each other but in which everybody is fundamentally the same. The men have 
identical dogs. White and black wear identical clothes (paradoxically, European 
clothes are represented as “natural,” perhaps because the alternative would have 
required Frankland to draw his white figures as naked as his black). Thus the 
principles upon which the rule of law will be based are established—equality, 
individual rights, and sameness.22 By presenting these principles of justice as a priori, 
Frame A naturalizes their truth and their applicability to all societies.
 In Frame B, we enter the world of politics and history. The Aborigines lose their 
clothes and gain a community. White and Black are no longer depicted as the same; 
instead, they are representatives of different societies, hands outstretched towards an 
agreement. But this is clearly not an agreement between equals. Frame B depicts as 
unproblematic the transfer of sovereignty from native to colonial rulers. A new 
political authority and hierarchy is acknowledged, reflected in the movement from 
left to right of the picture—from Aboriginal to British society, from naked to 
clothed, from subservient to dominant. Neither Frankland nor Arthur were naïve. 
They did not believe for a moment that this transfer was as consensual as Frame B 
suggests. On the contrary, the Aboriginal people were waging a guerilla war against 
the f ledgling British colony. But, as Arthur remarked, “I cannot divest myself of the 
consideration that all aggression originated with the white inhabitants.”23 Frame B 
not only portrays the fait accompli of British sovereignty, it justifies it by looking both 
forward and back: forward, to the day when the Tasmanian Aborigines might indeed 
consent to the reality of that rule, and back, to the principles in Frame A according 
to which they are given a reason—a duty, even—to consent to that rule. The picture 
suggests the second part of a syllogism: because A, then B. Because of the universal 
promise of the rule of law (Frame A), you should accept as legitimate the government 
that is committed to uphold it (Frame B).
 The final two frames expand this syllogism by explicating the legal consequences 
of its logic. This is not philosophy in the subjunctive mood or history in the futur 
anterieur,24 but law in the present tense. Abstract principles are brought into the real 
world, where violent justice is meted out to violent crime. The last two pictures 
declare a substantive legal rule—the prohibition against murder. But more importantly, 
they relate that prohibition to basic principles of justice and to the legitimate role of 
the government in enforcing them. There is an implied threat in Frame C, but it is 
clearly balanced by the implied guarantee of Frame D and by the insistence that in 
each case the British army stands quite apart from the actors and neutrally enforces 
the law. Governor Arthur had said as much in his very first Proclamation as governor, 
22. Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (1989); Will Kymlicka, Multicultural 
Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (1995).
23. Ryan, supra note 14, at 94.
24. See Derrida, supra note 16.
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some years previously: “The Natives of this island being under the protection of the 
same laws which protect the settlers, every violation of those laws in the persons or 
property of the Natives shall be visited with the same punishment as though 
committed on the person or property of any settler.”25
 But the pictorial Proclamation goes further than a mere statement of judicial 
neutrality in its articulation of justice to Aboriginal peoples. It gives justificatory 
pride of place, as we have seen, to principles of equality, individualism, and sameness. 
Governor Arthur’s Proclamation presents a more complex and substantive reading of 
the rule of law than one might have expected. It builds the legitimacy of law on a 
promise to treat all persons, black or white, with equal respect for their individuality 
and an assumption of their fundamental sameness.
III. GOVERNOR ARTHUR AND THE DEFERRAL OF THE RULE OF LAW
 The paradox that this drawing raises lies in the difficulty of squaring “the real 
wishes of the government,” as the Proclamation presents it, with the “the actual state 
of things” in Van Diemen’s Land. At the very same time that Governor Arthur’s 
Proclamation elaborated an expansive commitment to the rule of law, he was 
extending martial law throughout Tasmania. Martial law had initially been declared 
in 1828 in the face of Aboriginal resistance to colonial settlement.26 In February of 
1830, a reward of five pounds was proclaimed for the capture of adult Aborigines 
(two pounds for a child), describing them as “a horde of [s]avages” consumed by 
“revengeful feelings.”27 In October of 1830, faced by “continued repetitions of the 
most wanton and sanguinary acts of violence and outrage,” Arthur extended martial 
law to “every part of this Island.”28 On October 7, “the [white] community . . . en 
masse” was to spread out like a human chain across the whole island and, by moving 
forward, herd the Black or Aboriginal Natives on to Tasman’s Peninsula where they 
could be penned in once and for all.29
 Yet martial law had always been understood as involving the suspension of the 
rule of law.30 In 1829, the brutal murder of an Aboriginal woman was deemed by the 
Solicitor-General to be beyond the reach of the common law precisely because it fell 
25. Reynolds, supra note 17, at 91.
26. Id. at 109.
27. Colonial Secretary’s Office, Government Order No. 2, Hobart Town Gazette (Tas.), Feb. 27, 1830, 
available at http://www.law.mq.edu.au/research/colonial_case_law/tas/cases/case_index/1830/notices_
concerning_aborigines/notice_1_1830/.
28. George Arthur, A Proclamation, Hobart Town Gazette (Tas.), Oct. 2, 1830, available at http://www.
law.mq.edu.au/research/colonial_case_law/tas/cases/case_index/1830/notices_concerning_aborigines/
notice_7_1830/.
29. Colonial Secretary’s Office, Government Order No. 11, Hobart Town Gazette (Tas.), Sept. 22, 1830, 
available at http://www.law.mq.edu.au/research/colonial_case_law/tas/cases/case_index/1830/notices_
concerning_aborigines/notice_6_1830/ [hereinafter Government Order No. 11].
30. The connections with Agamben’s articulation and study of the state of exception are evident and need 
not be spelled out here. See Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception (Kevin Attell trans., 2005); see 
also R. W. Kostal, A Jurisprudence of Power (2005).
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under the very broad rubric of “necessary operations against the enemies.”31 Subject 
to “an active and extended system of Military operations against the Natives 
generally” and until the “cessation of hostilities,” Aboriginal Tasmanians were 
specifically placed outside the rule of law.32 The Black Line, a dismal and notorious 
folly, led to the capture of a grand total of two Aborigines and the shooting of two 
more, but it was powerfully evocative of the colonial government’s attitude towards 
them.33 The last full-blooded Tasmanian Aborigine died in 1876.
 One might argue that Frankland’s depiction of equality under the law in Frames 
C and D is a trick. The rule of law is not without its critics: in general, they argue 
that its noble rhetoric disguises in two ways how those with power actually enforce 
the law. First, the Proclamation does not tell the truth. Its promise of equal treatment 
was a lie: in fact, white attacks on black people were virtually unpunishable, whereas 
black attacks on white settlers were branded as the emanations of “a wanton and 
savage spirit.”34 Secondly, the Proclamation begs the question: what does it mean to 
treat people “equally” in the colonial context? The abstract thinking involved in 
treating Aboriginal murder the same as that of a white settler ignores the difference 
in meaning and context of their actions. Even if the British government were strictly 
neutral as between the two deaths drawn by Frankland (which it was not), the rule of 
law would still sustain settler society and destroy Aboriginal society precisely by 
treating them “equally.” The claim in Frame A that whites and blacks are the same, 
for example, and that each can just as easily nurse the other’s baby, misses the 
underlying social and economic reality, which makes nonsense of the equivalence. A 
black woman nursing a white baby is a servant in a rich man’s house; a white woman 
nursing a black baby is probably a missionary who has taken the child from his 
mother. Equal treatment perpetuates inequality every time it purposely turns a blind 
eye to social and material difference. By ignoring the complexities of context, and by 
lying about actual legal practices that were going on at the time, the rule of law 
rhetoric systematically varnishes the injustices perpetrated by colonial power.
 Such an analysis, powerful as it is, remains inadequate because it fails to take 
seriously the beliefs of the participants, particularly their ideology of the rule of law. 
Frankland, “innocent but misguided,”35 believed in the Proclamation. Arthur himself 
consistently sought to justify the violence he unleashed in compassionate terms. 
31. Reynolds, supra note 17, at 112.
32. Arthur, supra note 28.
33. Clive Turnbull, Black War: The Extermination of the Tasmanian Aborigines (1948); House 
of Commons, Van Diemen’s Land: Copies of All Correspondence Between Lieutenant-
Govenor Arthur and His Majesty’s Secretary of State for the Colonies, on the Subject of 
the Military Operations Lately Carried on Against the Aboriginal Inhabitants of Van 
Diemen’s Land (1831) Parl. Papers No. 259 (U.K).
34. The words come from Report of the Committee appointed by Sir George Arthur according to which 
Archdeacon Broughton had been instructed to inquire into “the origin of the hostility displayed by the 
Black Natives of this island against the settlers.” N.J.B. Plomley et al., The Aboriginal/Settler 
Clash in Van Diemen’s Land, 1803–31 9 (1992).
35. The Dictionary of Australian Artists, supra note 11, at 273.
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There was this strange ambivalence in his gestures, which always seemed to sway in 
confusion between the violent actions he sets in motion and the desire to protect the 
Aborigines from those same forces. He insisted that “the Government puts forward 
its strength on this occasion by no means whatever with a view of seeking the 
destruction of the Aborigines.”36 Even the Proclamation which instituted the Black 
Line concluded that
the Lieutenant Governor takes this opportunity of again enjoining the whole 
community to bear in mind, that the object in view is not to injure or destroy 
the unhappy Savages, against whom these movements will be directed, but to 
capture and raise them in the scale of civilization by placing them under the 
immediate control of a competent establishment, from whence they will not 
have it in their power to escape and molest the White Inhabitants of the 
Colony, and where they themselves will no longer be subject to the miseries of 
perpetual warfare, or to the privations which the extension of the Settlements 
would progressively entail upon them, were they to remain in their present 
unhappy state.37
The name of the place on Flinders Island where the last of the Tasmanian Aborigines 
were finally sequestered, and where they died, was Point Civilization. Their capture 
and control was seen as the necessary first step in raising them to a civilized state, an 
educative if coercive process that would also, presumably, serve to quench that savage 
spirit in them.
 Frame A of the pictogram presents Rousseau’s vision of the state of nature. But 
Governor Arthur’s policy is bleaker and owes more to Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes had 
argued in the seventeenth century that without an all-powerful government to 
control our baser instincts, there would be nothing but warfare and misery, “and 
which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, 
solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”38 Arthur’s government embodies what 
Hobbes famously termed the Leviathan: a monster, a tyrant who is nevertheless 
necessary and whose violence and absolute power saves us—and more particularly in 
this case the Aboriginal people—from the “warfare” and “privations” of our hideous 
natural condition.
 Accordingly, the pictorial Proclamation does not lie or conceal. It is meant 
seriously, but it is to be read in the future tense. In effect, Governor Arthur was 
saying to the first Tasmanians: “We do believe in your potential for equality and 
sameness. We look forward to that moment when you will consent peaceably to our 
governance. And we will then treat you as subject to the same laws and protections 
as the rest of us. But until the conditions of sameness and equality are attained, all 
bets are off.” Not “because A, then B, therefore C and D,” but “when A and B, then 
C and D.” Governor Arthur’s Proclamation paradoxically justifies the un-depicted 
36. Reynolds, supra note 17, at 109 (quoting a letter to the Brigade Major’s Office dated November 3, 
1828).
37. Government Order No. 11, supra note 29.
38. Hobbes, supra note 21, at 78.
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violence of the Black Wars, just as the Leviathan is justified, by asserting that it is 
only by such violence that the promised land can be attained.
 Some contemporary writers on the rule of law have made a broadly similar point, 
and it is significantly different from the criticisms I noted above. They have 
resuscitated Hobbes, Schmitt, and others, arguing that the liberal promise of a 
society entirely governed by the constraints and protections of the rule of law suffers 
from a fatal f law. In Homo Sacer39 and State of Exception,40 Giorgio Agamben argues 
that, increasingly in modern society, the very plenitude of the rule of law gives rise to 
these pockets of non-law, established by the ruler’s power—a power that is not 
necessarily written down, but inheres in the nature of sovereignty to inaugurate or to 
suspend the legal order.
 It is surely unarguable that in recent years we have seen not the disappearance, 
but rather the normalization, of the state of exception, such as in the treatment of 
refugees or stateless persons and in the creation of juristic black holes like Guantanamo 
Bay, wherein the U.S. President has precisely claimed the executive privilege to 
determine the extent to which national and international law apply.41 The “war on 
terror” is the most obvious example of a “state of exception” that has been justified 
precisely as a way to protect the same ideals that are simultaneously scorned as 
“quaint” or “outmoded.”42 Other examples abound; from Malaya to Pakistan, the 
language of “national emergency” has been used to suspend legal principles. As 
recently as 2007, Australia’s international commitments concerning racial 
discrimination were specifically suspended when newly enacted laws profoundly 
changed the treatment of Aboriginal Australians in the Northern Territory.43 This 
legislation was directly justified by reference to a so-called “national emergency” in 
those communities.44 In each case, governments have excised persons, groups, or 
places from the protection of the rule of law. In each case, the creation of these black 
holes has been justified through the language of “exception,” “exclusion,” “crisis,” 
“martial law,” or “national emergency.” In each case, the values we stand for are held 
39. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Werner Hamacher & David E. 
Wellbery eds., Daniel Heller-Roazen trans., Bd. of Tr. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. 1998).
40. Agamben, supra note 30, at 129.
41. See The Torture Papers: The Road to Abu Ghraib (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 
2005).
42. See generally Wash. Legislative Office of the ACLU, The Civil Rights Record of Attorney 
General Nominee Alberto Gonzales (2005).
43. Manderson, supra note 1, at 219.
44. Northern Territory National Emergency Response Act 2007 (NT) s 5 (Austl.); see also John Howard & Mal 
Brough, Joint Press Conference to Announce the Northern Territory Intervention (June 21, 2007), 
http://australianpolitics.com/audio/2000-2009/2007-archive; Media Release, Mal Brough, Minister for 
Families, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and the Minister Assisting the Prime Minister 
for Indigenous Affairs, National Emergency Response to Protect Aboriginal Children in the NT, 
Australian Government (June 21, 2007), http://www.formerministers.fahcsia.gov.au/malbrough/
mediareleases/2007/Pages/emergency_21june07.aspx. See generally Paul ‘t Hart, Crisis Exploitation: 
Reflections on the ‘National Emergency’ in Australia’s Northern Territory, 26 Dialogue 51 (2007).
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not to apply—they are suspended or deferred—but at the same time and with equal 
force, we are told that we need these exceptions, these pockets, if the rule of law is to 
emerge or to survive at all.
 The great historian of nineteenth-century England, E.P. Thompson, famously 
described the rule of law as “an unqualified good.”45 He acknowledged the criticisms 
of its partiality and hypocrisy, but insisted that the rule of law had a capacity to go 
beyond the limited contexts in which the ruling class deploys it, operating instead as 
an ideal with the power to hold those rulers to account. That remains true. 
Nevertheless, Thompson fails, I think, to reflect adequately on how the ideal of the 
rule of law itself might be used not merely to conceal oppression but to actively incite 
it, either against those that do not live up to its criteria or in the context of events 
that are imagined to require its suspension.
 Governor Arthur’s Proclamation shows us exactly how this paradox works. The 
annihilation of the rule of law is not subsidiary to its glorification but brought about 
by it. It is not that Aboriginal people did not deserve the rule of law. On the contrary, 
it was their own “savage spirit” that prevented their attaining it. And it was to quench 
this savage spirit that the rule of law had to be suspended in order that the Leviathan 
of the British Empire might first—literally and figuratively—bring them to Point 
Civilization. The very belief in the rule of law highlighted the apparent inadequacy of 
the Tasmanian Aborigines to benefit from it, and this in turn justified any and all 
measures to impose legal and social order on them. The more beautiful the ideal, the 
more inadequate the present state of the natives seemed. The more sincere the British 
commitment to our universal sameness, the more Aboriginal difference and resistance 
seemed a “wanton” “fierceness” to be subjugated or a “weakness” to be fixed.
 The images of Governor Arthur’s Proclamation, juxtaposed against the colonial 
government’s actual policy, do not reveal lies or evasions. On the contrary, they are 
cause and effect. It was because Arthur and Frankland, and many like them, believed 
so fervently in the rule of law that Aboriginal people, on the one hand, were always 
disappointing them and, on the other, required emergency action or exceptional 
measures to drag them into civilization’s embrace. Governor Arthur’s Proclamation did 
not establish the rule of law in Tasmania; it justified the state of exception. Saint 
Augustine said, “Give me chastity and continence, but not yet.”46 Sir George Arthur 
said, “Lord, give me the rule of law—but not yet.” The goals of the Proclamation 
remained, but making good on them was always deferred to some indefinite future 
when Aboriginal people would at last be deemed ready for it.
 Meanwhile, the rule of law proved to be just another rod with which to chastise 
the first Tasmanians for their failure to live up to our expectations. With this idea of 
cause and effect in mind, we can return to Frame A of Governor Arthur’s Proclamation. 
We might read it as a promise of actual equality. But we could just as easily—in fact, 
perhaps more easily—read the image literally, as insisting that Aboriginal people 
45. E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act 267 (1975).
46. Saint Augustine, Book Eight, in Confessions 139, 152 (Hendricks Publishers Mtg. 2004) (c. 400 
A.D.).
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should not just be treated but should be the same, that they should wear the same 
clothes as us, bring up their children like us, even train their dogs like us. This is of 
course not a message of equality, but of assimilation. It demands that what changes 
is not our treatment of other races but their behaviour. Once again, it is not just that 
the work of art is ambiguous, but that it means both these things and helps us see the 
relationship between them. For centuries, one emergency after another, colonial and 
post-colonial regimes have postponed treating indigenous people with justice, deciding 
that they are not yet worthy of it or up to it. Now, as in 1830, this is the dark side of 
the glowing promises made by the rule of law—the insidious consequences of the 
righteousness it encourages.47
IV. ANOTHER ICON
 The assimilationist undercurrent of Governor Arthur’s Proclamation, together with 
the paradoxical consequences of its ideals, suggest that we ought to look elsewhere to 
find visions of justice in the context of the colonial and post-colonial world. The 
Proclamation is not the only instance of pictorial law from which we might learn. 
Almost two centuries earlier, another invading colonial power sought to communicate 
with another indigenous people, likewise in the absence of a shared language and 
across a cultural abyss. The Two-Row Wampum records a treaty, several versions of 
which are said to have organized relations between North American settlers and the 
Iroquois people (themselves a federation) in colonial times, going back as far as one 
made with the Dutch in New York in 1613 and another with William Penn in 1682.48 
As Governor Arthur’s Proclamation drew on Aboriginal bark paintings, so these 
treaties drew on the indigenous practice of wampum, in which strings of purple and 
white mussel shells were woven into a belt by which oral traditions were recorded, 
recalled, and sanctified.49 The Two-Row Wampum is a belt, a long string of such 
shells in parallel purple stripes set against a white background. According to 
Haudenosaunee tradition,
[y]ou say that you are our Father and I am your son. We say, we will not be 
like Father and Son, but like Brothers. This wampum belt confirms our 
words. These two rows will symbolize two paths or two vessels, traveling 
down the same river together. One, a birch bark canoe, will be for the Indian 
People, their laws, their customs and their ways. The other, a ship, will be for 
the white people and their laws, their customs and their ways. We shall each 
travel the river together, side by side, but in our boat. Neither of us will try to 
steer the other’s vessel.50
47. See Sherene H. Razack, Dark Threats & White Knights (2004).
48. Ann Uhry Abrams, Benjamin West’s Documentation of Colonial History: William Penn’s Treaty with the 
Indians, 64 Art Bull. 59 (1982); Hezekiah Butterworth, The Wampum Belt (1897).
49. See W.J. Sidis, The Tribes And the States, chapter 3 (1935); The History and Culture of 
Iroquois Diplomacy (Francis Jennings et al. eds., 1985).
50. The Two Row Wampum, Ganondagon, http://www.ganondagan.org/wampum.html (last visited May 
21, 2012).
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 So the two art works are very different. In the seventeenth century, as we see in 
the empires of North and South America, God would act as the agent of civilization 
and unification, but communities would be allowed to keep their own laws. By the 
nineteenth century, as we see in the empires of Australasia, Asia, and Africa, law 
would act as the agent of civilization and unification, and communities would be 
allowed to keep their own gods. On the one hand, and perhaps with the arrogance of 
the British empire, Governor Arthur lays claims to a uniform ideal of justice which 
transcends and binds all peoples. On the other hand, and perhaps because it was 
drawn 200 years later, the Two-Row Wampum recognizes that the difference in 
power and technology between colonial master and subject peoples cannot be 
ignored. The Proclamation speaks vertically, from governors to the governed. The 
treaty speaks horizontally, an agreement between peoples.
 There are surely elements of justice in our dealings with indigenous peoples that 
the Two-Row Wampum reveals and to which the Proclamation is blind. Researchers 
in Canada have increasingly over the last few years become interested in the Two-
Row Wampum as an alternative social justice model. The wampum belt does not treat 
people as isolated and identical individuals, but recognizes instead that they live their 
lives in vessels, communities whose difference is valuable to them and worthy of 
respect, and whose trajectories may therefore not be identical. In this way, although 
the wampum belt is a more abstract art form than the Proclamation, it succeeds in 
describing a more concrete social reality. Indeed, the abstraction of the Proclamation’s 
principle of sameness is what allows its noble idea to be converted into a force of 
homogenization. Instead, the beautiful image of “the birch bark canoe” and “the 
ship” afloat on the same river invites us to think of ways in which we can listen to 
and help those whose life-worlds may be very different from ours in their journey, 
without simply trying “to steer the other’s vessel.” As much as “equal treatment,” that 
is also a notion of justice: justice embedded in communities whose difference is itself 
a kind of collective equality worthy of respectful attention.51
 There is a question here not just of practice or of principle, but of what, from an 
aesthetic point of view, we might call perspective. The Iroquois offered to share the 
river with the invaders, to live side by side with them and to move together with the 
currents that affect them both. There is something welcoming and generous in that 
gesture. The shared river does not only separate communities but suggests common 
interests and experiences too. The language of brotherhood, like the parallel lines of 
the belt itself, suggests neither sameness nor difference but closeness, and above all 
implies a willingness to make room for each other. The Proclamation, for its part, 
makes no such gesture. Frame B shows a scene of welcome. But it represents the 
ceding of authority from indigenous to colonial rulers—an authority that, as Frames 
C and D illustrate, is unitary, objective, and absolute. While the Two-Row Wampum 
starts from the principle of indigenous authority over the land and proceeds to make 
others welcome on it, Governor Arthur’s Proclamation starts from the fact of colonial 
51. See Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community, and Culture (1989); Will Kymlicka, Multicultural 
Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (1995).
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authority over the land and proceeds to take exclusive control of it. Of course, the 
reason for this difference is that the two images are written from different 
perspectives, the wampum by the indigenous people of the land and the Proclamation 
by the colonial power. That is precisely the point. While our understanding of justice 
and our commitment to the rule of law only pays attention to the latter voice, it will 
continue to perpetrate injustice in its name. The goal of this essay has been to show 
exactly how and why that can happen.
V. CONCLUSION
 The ability of art to encapsulate ideas and at the same time to expand or destabilize 
them is evident from this case study. Images have always been privileged media for 
the articulation, dissemination, and interrogation of social forms and practices, in 
largely pre-literate cultures such as early modern Europe, but no less in post-literate 
cultures of affect and spectacle, such as late modern Europe.52 Art works offer a 
significant diagnostic tool in our understanding and interrogation of legal ideas.
 There is a critical cultural opportunity here that has gone largely unremarked. 
Since European settlement in Australia, as in other colonial societies, indigenous 
groups have been required to translate their distinct legal visions into the one-size-fits-
all language and structures of British law.53 Yet in many cultures, art and literature are 
central elements to the performance and embodiment of law.54 Traditional thinking 
about law in the West has explicitly rejected such an approach, even on occasion 
announcing that Aboriginal rites and dances cannot be law if they be art.55 Such a 
constrained imagination has proven a genuine barrier to recognition of indigenous 
law.56 We see some recognition of the need for a cross-cultural and aesthetic dialogue 
about law in the Canadian context in particular, which has been more sensitive to the 
relevance of languages of art and culture in the construction of law and politics.57 But 
overall these forays have been limited and implicit. The grammar and vocabulary of 
images could inaugurate a new cross-cultural conversation, and provide a new vehicle 
of social engagement and discourse, on new and radically different terms.
52. See Richard K. Sherwin, When Law Goes Pop: The Vanishing Line between Law and Popular 
Culture (2000); Richard K. Sherwin, Law in the Age of Images, in Visual Literacy in Action 179, 
179–84 (Jim Elkins ed. 2007). 
53. Stewart Motha & Colin Perrin, Deposing Sovereignty after Mabo, 13 Law & Critique 231 (2002); Paul 
Patton, Mabo, Freedom and the Politics of Difference, 30 Austl. J. Pol. Sci. 108 (1995).
54. See Howard Morphy, Becoming Art: Exploring Cross-Cultural Categories (2007); John 
Burrows, Recovering Canada: The Resurgence of Indigenous Law (2002); Kathy Laster, 
Law as Culture (2d ed. 2001).
55. See Peter Fitzpatrick, The Mythology of Modern Law, in Sociology of Law & Crime (Maureen 
Cain & Carol Smart eds., 1992); Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (Can.).
56. Kirsten Anker, The Truth in Painting: Cultural Artefacts as Proof of Native Title, 9 Law Text Culture 
91, 111 (2005).
57. See, for example, references to the work of Dorothy Reid in Burrows, supra note 54, at 19, 178 n. 129, 
and references to the work of Bill Reid in James Tully, Strange Multiplicity: Constitutionalism 
in an Age of Diversity (5th reprint 2004) (1995).
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 The images that have formed the spine of this case study have given material 
form and aesthetic feeling to a subject that is frequently rendered bloodless. 
Separating legal ideas from cultural practices and lived experiences is an exercise in 
social alienation with serious consequences. For if the rule of law is to survive, 
however we understand its strengths and limitations, it will be because of the way it 
speaks to us and because of the feelings it is capable of arousing in us. Without these 
cultural narratives and these affective attachments, no one has any reason to care 
about it, to understand it, or to improve it. There is no more moving commentary on 
American ideals and history than Jimi Hendrix’ improvisation on The Star Spangled 
Banner at Woodstock at the height of the Vietnam War.58 There, the orthodox 
narrative of U.S. history is juxtaposed powerfully with multiple and conf licting 
voices: hope and respect, but also anger, frustration, and sarcasm. The aesthetic form 
allows a dialogue between ideals, myths, and reality to be expressed with remarkable 
power, emotion, and concision. Hendrix’ art gives us a connection as vibrant and as 
physical as a guitar string through which these questions and associations feel like 
they matter to us. The depiction of law and of justice in the arts is a critical and 
desperately undervalued resource in understanding law’s cultural resonances, in 
depicting and contesting its historical narratives, and in constituting its emotional 
place within a society or societies. One of the major tasks of twenty-first century 
research is to begin to make available and to study this forgotten common wealth of 
sounds and images.
58. Jimi Hendrix, Star Spangled Banner (Jan. 9, 1969), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u_k-
6FLfDkM.
